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2 UNIVERSITY OF KENT / RESEARCH REPORT
SUMMARY
Dover, Kent is one of the main UK entry
points for child asylum-seekers, many of
whom are from Afghanistan. Some are
granted asylum, but the majority are
refused and granted discretionary leave to
remain (DL, now UASC leave)1 until they
reach 17½ years old, under Home Office2
policy. Many remain in the UK despite
having lost all appeals against subsequent
applications to stay. Some are still ‘looked
after’ by local authorities under the
‘leaving care’ provisions.3Many survive by
working illegally, sleeping in friends’
accommodation, in fear of being picked up,
detained and removed to Afghanistan by
charter flight.
In 2012 the Court of  Appeal decided the case of  KA
(Afghanistan),4 which acknowledged that the Home Office had
systematically failed to endeavour to trace the family members
of young unaccompanied asylum seekers, and decided that ‘a
remedy’ should be provided for at least some of  these young
people. With new resources to carry out immigration and
asylum work funded jointly by the University and a consortium
of charitable funders5, in December 2012 Kent Law Clinic
began to work with local organisations to identify young people
who could potentially benefit from that judgment, and, in
working on their cases, investigate and identify the factors
surrounding how these children became failed asylum-seekers.
This report sets out our detailed analysis of  the cases of  20
refused Afghan asylum seekers assisted by Kent Law Clinic.
The evidence from these cases supports a wider concern
amongst both practitioners and academics that specific
common factors contribute towards children eventually
becoming ‘failed asylum seekers’. For many young people the
refugee determination procedure appears like an administrative
justice processing machine, in which bureaucratic imperatives
of cost and time, of  contractual compliance, and of  a culture of
disbelief, produce failed asylum-seekers as the most likely
outcome. In relation to young people from Afghanistan,
practitioners sometimes see little difference in the young
people’s own stories between those who are granted refugee
status and those who are not.
Despite detailed guidance, quality oversight and critical
inspection reports, the Home Office’s default position is still to
refuse. Social Services often assess young people as older
than their claimed age, sometimes by only a few months, and
the age assessments are not always made available.
Tribunal determinations rely on ‘implausibilities’ to dismiss
appeals despite reference to the correct guidelines on
children’s evidence. Even though legal aid still pays whatever
can be justified for representing child asylum-seekers, many
applicants face the Home Office and the Tribunal with brief
accounts flawed by unexplained discrepancies. And most
seriously, even where a claim identifies clear errors of  law or
illegal Home Office procedures, and binding caselaw on
‘corrective remedies’ clearly applies, young people’s claims are
dismissed, often by what seem to us to be tortuous logic.
Our work focused first on whether any of  our clients could
make fresh claims based on KA, and then reflected on the
whole asylum process from arrival to exhaustion of  all appeal
rights, as revealed in these cases. We then critically review the
courts’ development of  the ‘corrective remedy’ principle since
KA in relation to young people’s asylum claims. We ask
whether in the light of  these developments the courts are ever
likely to provide a ‘sanction’ against errors of  the Secretary of
State, and consider what alternative strategies might assist
young asylum-seekers.
We resolve to continue working with local practitioners and
other organisations to draw wider attention to these issues, to
try to ensure that other young people’s claims are dealt with in
accordance with best practice.
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MAIN RESEARCH
FINDINGS
• Most young people had not appealed against the initial refusal
of asylum. Then, in all those cases, their application for further leave
was refused largely based on the applicant’s alleged implicit
acceptance of the allegations in the first refusal.
• Most Home Office refusals and Tribunal dismissals were on
grounds of incredibility and implausibility. 
• Most young people refused on credibility grounds had also been
age-disputed by Social Services
• Some refusals relied on initial ‘illegal entry’ interviews conducted
on arrival without appropriate safeguards such as legal representation
or the presence of an appropriate adult.
• Some young people endured long-drawn-out appeal processes,
and had become 18 by the time their case went before a tribunal. 
• The best interests of the child were rarely considered other than
by inserting standard text. 
• Family tracing was not carried out in any of the cases, and in
some cases the Home Office stated that family tracing in Afghanistan
was impossible. Nevertheless, in some cases the issue of family
tracing was relied on by Home Office or Tribunal judge to discredit the
applicant’s claim. This is echoed in the later ‘corrective remedy’
judgments discussed in section C below. 
We hope these findings, echoing those in other reports, will spark




In Section A we provide a statistical background to the presence of  so
many young Afghan ‘failed asylum-seekers’ in Kent. Then we provide a
historical survey of  legal cases concerning the ‘corrective remedy’
principle, leading to the Court of  Appeal judgment in KA (Afghanistan)
which provided the impetus for this work. We set out our research
methodology, and summarise our conclusions.
Section B
In Section B we set out our evidence, looking at each stage of  the
asylum process in turn and referring to other recent research reports.
We note instances where procedures and decisions appear to flout
official guidance, formal UNHCR recommendations or indeed higher
court judgments dealing with specific procedural issues.
Section C
In Section C we set out the higher courts’ further development of  the
‘corrective remedy’ principle following KA, and critically examine how
that has been used in relation to family tracing in young people’s asylum
claims. We conclude that in relation to family tracing, the ‘corrective
remedy’ principle is unlikely to provide any safeguard for young people,
although other historical illegalities may still be challengeable.
Section D
Finally, in Section D, we review proposals by some commentators that to
provide a fair and safe asylum determination procedure for children and
young people requires an entirely fresh look.
5www.kent.ac.uk





1 Statistics and background
From 2006 – 2012 some 18,6746 young unaccompanied
asylum-seekers arrived in the UK, many through Dover, Kent.
Between April 2008 and April 2013, 1465 young asylum-
seekers have been supported by Kent Social Services (KSS).7
Most would have been referred to local legal aid solicitors, and
most dealt with by the Home Office Kent Local Immigration
Team (LIT).
National statistics for 20128 show that of  681 initial decisions
on those who arrived as unaccompanied minors, 28% were
granted refugee status or humanitarian protection, 51% were
refused asylum but were granted discretionary leave (DL)
under Home Office policy until the age of  17½, on the formal
basis that there are inadequate reception facilities for them in
their home country,9 while 21% were refused. In March 2013
this grant of  discretionary leave was formally incorporated into
the immigration rules.10 Young people who are refused asylum
can now be granted 30 months UASC leave under the
immigration rules, which can be renewed until the age of  17½.
Many young unaccompanied asylum-seekers are from
Afghanistan. They comprised 30% of new applications in 2011,
but over 50% of those arriving in 2009. Their claims concern:
fear of  forcible recruitment to armed groups; a fear of  reprisals
against family members involved with the Afghan Government
or international forces; fear of  being killed in family conflicts, or
in the continuing Taliban insurgency. Of 184 newly-decided
Afghan cases in 2012 only 32 were granted asylum11, with just
1 being granted Humanitarian Protection (HP) (18% in total).12
Some 121 (66%) were granted DL until 17½ and 30 (16%) were
refused outright13. This means that either their account was not
believed or, if  believed, it was nevertheless decided that they
would not be at risk of  persecution or serious harm in
Afghanistan. Yet the UNHCR and other international
organisations have documented the serious risks that children
face in Afghanistan, noted that child labour is widespread, child
abuse is endemic and that unaccompanied children are among
the most exposed and vulnerable section of  that society.14
The majority of  those granted DL/UASC leave apply for further
leave to remain, and most are refused and expected to return
home.15 However, few choose voluntary return,16 and remain in
the UK, now categorised as ‘failed asylum seekers’ rather than
‘children’. In the first 4 months of  2013 360 failed asylum-
seekers were removed to Afghanistan.17
Local support organisations remain concerned that the Home
Office ‘culture of  disbelief’,18 the political complexion and
budget pressures of  the local authority, and pressures on legal
representatives working to legal aid contract terms19 have not
well served these young people.
In July 2012, in the case of  KA (Afghanistan),20 the Court of
Appeal decided that in failing to trace the families of  asylum-
seeking children from Afghanistan, the Home Office had
unlawfully failed to follow the requirements of  the EU Reception
Directive on the treatment of  child asylum-seekers.21 Following
the cases of  Rashid22 and R (S),23 ‘a remedy’ should be
provided to those young people even if  now over 18 and no
longer refugees: they should potentially be granted leave to
remain.
From December 2012 Kent Law Clinic accepted referrals of
young people who could potentially benefit from KA, and, in
working on their cases, sought to identify how these children
became ‘failed asylum-seekers’.
2 Legal background to the ‘corrective remedy’
principle and its application in children’s
cases
The cases of  Rashid24 and R (S)25, decided in 2005 and 2007,
considered what impact a finding of  an historic illegality should
have on a claim, when there is no current basis for it to
succeed. Those cases concerned individuals excluded from
Home Office policies because of  ‘conspicuous unfairness’ and
delay.
Rashid, an Iraqi asylum-seeker, arrived in 2001, when Home
Office policy provided for refugee status and indefinite leave to
remain (ILR) for Iraqis. He was refused, and further
representations refused in 2004 under the post- Iraq war policy.
The SSHD relied on Ravichandran,26 which required a current
well- founded fear of  persecution, and argued that there is no
public law principle requiring compensation for past failures.
The court decided that the erroneous first refusal arose from a
‘catalogue of  serious administrative errors’ and had denied
Rashid his refugee rights: such ‘conspicuous unfairness’ that it
amounted to ‘an abuse of  power requiring intervention by the
court,’ 27 requiring a corrective remedy, under the ‘residual or
general power’ under the Immigration Act 1971 ss 3 & 4.
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In R (S) the claimant (and many others) had been excluded
from a Home Office exceptional leave to remain (ELR) policy
because the Home Office had prioritised new claims in order to
meet new Public Service Agreement target times, not reaching
S’s claim until the ELR policy had been withdrawn. The court
expressed reservations about the consequences of  Rashid.
Carnwath LJ stated (para 39):
‘…it seeks to transform ‘abuse of  power’ into a magic
ingredient, able to achieve remedial results which other
forms of  illegality cannot match’
Nevertheless the court decided (para 54) that if  there had been
illegality and the Department has the power to correct it, it
should do so, and while an asylum decision must still be made
based on present circumstances, it must be recognised that
‘those circumstances include the present need to remedy
injustice caused by a past illegality’ (R (S) para 47).
In the aftermath of  these cases, the Home Office issued
caseowner guidance28 which enabled a large number of
refused asylum seekers to benefit from a reconsideration of
their claim with a view to granting leave.
These cases arguably established a ‘corrective remedy’
principle allowing refused asylum seekers to benefit in cases of
conspicuous unfairness,29 and subsequent court judgments
relied on this to achieve ‘a remedy’ for the mishandling of
children’s claims.
The first of  these was AA (Afghanistan),30 heard in 2007. AA
was assessed as over 18 and was refused asylum outright. On
appeal he was accepted as aged 17, but his appeal was
dismissed, without regard to the Home Office failure to grant DL
to him according to their policy. The Court of  Appeal accepted
that there had been an error of  law but now had to consider
whether this was merely academic, given that at the date of  the
Court of  Appeal hearing the appellant was an adult of  19. The
Court accepted that that failure had deprived AA of the right to
work, obtain support, and apply for further leave. Keene LJ
directed the SSHD to remake their decision and consider
granting the appellant a period of  leave.
This case also addressed the issue of  the prejudice caused to
a minor who had been incorrectly assessed as an adult,
undergoing an asylum interview without appropriate
safeguards for a minor and having his claim decided without
regard to the appropriate guidance for assessing the claims of
children. Following AA, the Home Office issued guidance to
caseowners31 requiring them to ask: ‘Should the applicant be
granted leave due to perceived disbenefits arising from UKBA
errors?’ Caseowners were advised to consider reassessing the
weight attached to negative credibility points arising from
interview records which had been improperly conducted.
Three years later, the Court of  Appeal considered the issue
again. SL (Vietnam)32 was 14 when he arrived. Following a
series of  errors, his appeal against refusal of  asylum was
dismissed with no grant of  DL. He was arrested and a
deportation decision made. The Court of  Appeal decided that
the SSHD’s decision to deport failed to take into account her
failure to grant DL, or the impact her failure had had on the
appellant’s situation. His appeal was granted.
At that point the courts had identified at least 3 scenarios in
which past illegalities in the handling of  a young person’s
asylum claim had given rise to a corrective remedy:
• A past failure to grant Discretionary Leave (for example
following a non-Merton-compliant33 age assessment which is
later overturned (AA, SL)
• Reliance on an interview carried out without appropriate
safeguards for children (AA, AN & FA34)
• Failure to carry out family tracing (DS35, KA)
What these cases have in common is an attempt to find a just
solution for ‘failed asylum seekers’ now over 18, who have no
fresh claim but who maintain that their fear of  return to
Afghanistan was never properly considered. The case of  KA
can be seen as a further attempt to address this issue.
3 KA (Afghanistan), the ‘corrective principle’ and
family tracing 
When an unaccompanied child claims asylum in the UK the
Home Office has a duty to endeavour to trace family members.
The Reception Directive36 para 19(3), implemented in regulation
6 of  the Asylum Seekers (Reception Conditions) Regulations
2005,37 states:
Member States, protecting the unaccompanied minor’s best
interests, shall endeavour to trace the members of  his or her
family as soon as possible. In cases where there may be a
threat to the life or integrity of  the minor or his or her close
relatives, particularly if  they have remained in the country of
origin, care must be taken to ensure that the collection,
processing and circulation of  information concerning those
persons is undertaken on a confidential basis, so as to avoid
jeopardising their safety.
In the earlier case of  DS (Afghanistan)38 the Court of  Appeal
heard evidence that between 2006 and 2010 the Home Office
had systematically failed to implement this requirement, and
therefore had failed to have regard to the best interests of  a
child.39 The SSHD argued that referral of  a minor to the Red
Cross was sufficient to comply with this duty. However, the
judgment stated at para 47:
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‘…In the present case, however, the Secretary of  State did
nothing at all to assist with tracing family members or to
enquire about reception arrangements on return and the
court has been invited to uphold that inactivity. It is neither
necessary nor appropriate to specify precisely what should
have been done; this can be worked out once the principle
is established. What should be done will vary from case to
case. Inactivity, combined with the failure to bring to the
attention of  the Tribunal the instruments cited in this
judgment, was not, in my view, a permissible option.
The Secretary of  State seeks to defeat the claim by reason
of  the appellant’s alleged failure to cooperate with the Red
Cross. Tracing work by the ICRC would almost certainly
have been assisted by a contribution from the Secretary of
State, based on information available to her. The lack of
cooperation does not relieve the Secretary of  State of  her
duties’. (writers’ emphasis)
DS had further held that the Home Office failure to attempt to
trace the appellant’s family members was relevant to his asylum
claim, deciding that the Home Office failure to attempt to trace
his family had deprived him of  the evidence that he was not
able to contact them.
These findings are particularly important for young people from
Afghanistan. In LQ (Age: immutable characteristic)
Afghanistan,40 heard in 2008, the Upper Tribunal had
determined that since age is an immutable characteristic, an
orphan under the age of  18 may belong to a ‘particular social
group’ for the purposes of  the refugee convention. LQ was not
designated a country guidance case,41 but the 2011 country
guidance case of  AA (unattended children) Afghanistan42
recognises that unattached children returning to Afghanistan
may be at risk of  suffering serious harm.
In the earlier country guidance case of  HK (Afghanistan),43
heard after LQ, the Upper Tribunal had clearly wished to limit
refugee status to only those young people for whom it was
accepted that they had lost contact with their family. On appeal
to the Court of  Appeal in HK (Afghanistan)44 it was confirmed
that, where a family had assisted a child to travel to the UK, any
assertion that family members are unable to meet them on
return must be supported by credible evidence of  efforts to
contact those family members.
However, shortly after HK, a differently-constituted Court of
Appeal in KA (Afghanistan) considered how the systematic
failure to trace family members affected appellants who were
now over 18 and could not benefit from decisions such as LQ.
The court accepted that the failure to trace may be relevant to
judicial consideration of  the asylum claim, and to the best
interests of  the child, since those could not be satisfactorily
determined without knowing whether family members could be
traced. It was accepted that in certain cases there should now
be a ‘corrective remedy’ for such young people.
This judgment gave hope to those supporting young Afghan
‘failed asylum-seekers’ that something could now be done for
them.
4 Research methodology and outcomes for our
clients
Kent Law Clinic understood that as at December 2012 Kent
Social Services was supporting around 100 ‘appeal rights
exhausted’ young people over 18. The Clinic determined to
contact as many as possible to examine their case papers in
the light of  KA and see if, following that case or for any other
reason (such as Article 8 rights to family life), further
submissions or a fresh claim for asylum could be made. Every
client so contacted was asked to consent to the use of  their
case papers as a basis for identifying what common legal and
practical problems face young asylum-seekers in Kent. At that
time it was envisaged that we would eventually make contact
with most of  the relevant young people, either formally via
Social Services, through local organisations or by word of
mouth. However, we believe that some of  our potential clients
may have since been removed, and others have been afraid to
come forward.
Clients were recruited through a combination of  gatekeepers
and ‘snowball sampling’.45 This could not provide a statistically
representative sample of  the wider population of  young refused
asylum seekers, but the cases are typical of  those who remain
in contact with local support organisations.
We examined the formal papers46 of over 25 young people, 20
of whom were from Afghanistan. We considered whether Home
Office and other relevant guidance had been followed, what
legal arguments had been deployed, what findings of  fact had
been made, and considered the crucial legal issues arising at
each stage of  each case.
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5 Summary of research conclusions 
Our study considered every stage in the asylum process, and
looked at the acts of  the major relevant institutions involved at
each stage: Home Office, Kent Social Services, legal
representatives and tribunal judges. We considered what
factors had contributed to the failure of  our clients’ asylum
claims. Our study highlighted a number of  concerns which
reinforce the findings of  other studies (see below). We would
expect that a larger study would reveal similar conclusions.47
Our concerns are, in order of  importance:
• Most had not appealed against the initial refusal of asylum.
Then, in all those cases, their application for further leave was
refused largely based on the applicant’s alleged implicit
acceptance of  the allegations in the first refusal.
• Most refusals and Tribunal dismissals were on grounds of
incredibility and implausibility.
• Most claims refused on credibility grounds had also been
age-disputed by Social Services.
• Some refusals relied on initial ‘illegal entry’ interviews
conducted on arrival without appropriate safeguards such as
legal representation or the presence of  an appropriate adult.
• Some young people endured long-drawn-out appeal
processes, and had become 18 by the time their case went
before a tribunal.
• The best interests of the child were rarely considered other
than by inserting standard text.
• Family tracing was not carried out in any of the cases. In
some cases the issue of  family tracing was relied on by
Home Office or Tribunal judge to discredit the applicant’s
claim. This is echoed in the later ‘corrective remedy’
judgments discussed in section C below.
The next section sets out in detail the evidence from our clients’
cases.
Where further legal work appeared possible, the Clinic formally
prepared the claim with a student caseworker as with any other
Clinic case. Otherwise, where the client was still contactable,
the client was offered a full written advice and a face to face
discussion explaining their situation, which endeavoured to
explain to each client the precise weaknesses in their own
claim, any issues arising from previous advisers’ case
preparation, and any legal errors made by the Tribunal. We
believe, and generally those clients agreed with us, that this
kind of  detailed explanation was valuable to them even though
it did not change their current legal position.
In November 2013 a preliminary report was circulated to a
focus group of  specialist solicitors and researchers from 2
projects working on young peoples’ asylum claims (Migrant
and Refugee Children’s Unit, Islington Law Centre, and Law
Centres Network Principles to Practice (P2P)), and to the three
current Kent legal aid suppliers. We held a round table
discussion of  the conclusions emerging from the report, and
gathered participants’ own experiences of  the different stages
of the asylum process. Participants also considered the
relevance of  the ‘corrective remedy’ judgments to such clients’
cases. Student volunteers assisted in taking detailed notes of
the round table discussion. The comments of  practitioners have
been incorporated into the final report.
Most participants agreed that this was a most valuable meeting
from both research and practice points of  view. The group
plans to hold regular 3-monthly meetings to continue
discussions on developments in law, policy and practice, with
the aim of  improving outcomes for unaccompanied child
asylum-seekers in Kent, and a second meeting has already
been held.
Importantly, for 10 out of  the 20 clients we felt that further legal
action could be taken. For 3 clients we prepared out-of-time
appeals, one of  which was accepted, but the Home Office then
withdrew their decision. For 8 clients we prepared fresh claims,
4 based on KA (Afghanistan), of  which two were recorded as
fresh claims (one now has a right of  appeal, the other is
awaiting a decision), and 4 on other grounds. Three of  those
clients were then referred to legal aid solicitors. Unfortunately,
some clients whom we advised had an arguable fresh claim
have been too scared to approach the Home Office in person
to lodge it.
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1 Arrival, initial interview and screening
interview
Upon claiming asylum children are generally first subjected to a
screening interview to record basic personal details, a
summary of  their journey to the UK and information about the
basis of  the claim. However, some are interviewed even before
that, and both initial interviews and screening interviews have
been used against young people.
The issue of  initial interviews had been considered in 2012 by
the Court of  Appeal in AN (a child) & FA (a child).48 This case
established that a child should not be interviewed about the
substance of  their asylum claims without the presence of  an
appropriate adult. It was also recognised that it was
inappropriate for a vulnerable child to be interviewed upon
arrival following a long and tiring journey. Any initial detention
and interview should only be for the purposes of  protecting
their welfare.
Lord Justice Black stated:
I am not attracted to the idea that the mischief  can be
corrected by giving the child an opportunity to explain
himself  on an occasion when he does have the assistance
of  an independent adult (para 117).
It seems to me the appellants are right to say that
procedural and substantive safeguards are the most
effective means of  obtaining the child’s full and reliable
account of  the reasons why he is here and that those
safeguards should include the presence of  a responsible
adult when asylum is being discussed (para 122).
Where there has been a clear breach of  the principles set
out in the various provisions governing questioning about
asylum…. it ought at the very least to be exceedingly difficult
to persuade the court to admit material that has been
thereby obtained; some breaches will inevitably rule out
reliance on the material… (para 126)
A number of our clients had experienced on-entry interviews
carried out without a lawyer or responsible adult, and sometimes
before being allowed to wash, eat or drink. In some cases that
initial interview had a specific negative impact on the case.
Case 11 was interviewed on arrival, before any food or sleep,
via a telephone interpreter. His stated date of  birth was 14
though he was later assessed as 16. He was asked questions
about why he had entered the UK illegally, including information
about his substantive asylum claim. He was required to talk
about the death of  his brother, about treatment he had received
from his uncle, and about his journey. His answers were
recorded in barely-legible notes which were not provided until
his appeal against refusal of  further leave, several years after
the event. The fact that he had not mentioned the death of  his
mother in that first interview was relied on both in the initial
refusal letter and by the tribunal to find him not credible. He was
refused leave to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. Following the
case of  AN (a child) & FA (a child) it is strongly arguable that
the decisions of  both Tribunals to admit that interview were
wrong.
Case 5 was recorded as having in his jacket pocket a notebook
containing telephone numbers. The notebook was not kept as
evidence. No official attempted to telephone any of  the
numbers, nor was the applicant given an opportunity to explain
where it had come from. This was later referred to in his refusal
letter as evidence that he was being untruthful about contact
with his family. He explained to Kent Law Clinic that he had
been put in the back of  a refrigerated lorry, and the agent
provided him with several jackets which were not his, to keep
him warm.
Case 9 was refused because (among other reasons) the
account he gave in a later interview partly contradicted what he
had said in his initial interview conducted immediately upon
arrival. His explanation that he was ‘confused when he left the
lorry’ was not accepted.
Such examples were supported by the findings of  a 2012
Children’s Commissioner’s report.49 This revealed that the Home
Office had been subjecting newly-arrived unaccompanied
children to inappropriate ‘illegal entry interviews’, where
children were being made to sign screening interview records
to confirm the accuracy of  the contents in the absence of
appropriate safeguards. That report concluded that children
arriving to claim asylum are often ill, tired, hungry and
frightened, and generally not fit for interview. The report noted
the lack of  proper audit trail for evidence such as untranslated
documents, phone numbers and email addresses purportedly
found on arrival, with young people having no opportunity to
rebut any suspicions.50
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SECTION B: EVIDENCE FROM
THE ASYLUM PROCESS AS
EXPERIENCED BY OUR CLIENTS
(CONT)
The report recommended that any interviewing beyond the
gathering of  basic identity data should be postponed until the
child has had time to recover from the journey. It was also
recommended that telephone interpreting should not be used
for interviews that will lead to any immigration decision.
The Home Office view of  the screening interview is a ‘relaxed
non-contentious interview which is not used for his asylum
decision’, suggesting that representatives need not be
present.51 Yet several refusals in our sample had relied on initial
interviews and screening interviews to found negative
credibility decisions. Since the 2012 Children’s Commissioner
Report, it is understood that Kent LIT do not conduct formal
screening interviews upon arrival. Instead young people are
referred to social services, where they are either sent to the
Millbank Reception Centre or placed in foster care, and then
invited back to Kent Reporting Centre for the interview
accompanied by a responsible adult and a legal representative.
The use of  telephone interpreters for screening interviews
however, has continued. Participants at the round table
discussion observed that this is only an acceptable policy if
representatives are able to bring their own interpreters (which is
funded by the LAA) since the telephone connection is not
always clear, and misunderstandings do occur which have
required intervention to ensure that the interview record is
accurate. It was noted that using Farsi interpreters for Dari-
speaking applicants or using interpreters speaking the wrong
dialect of  Arabic can lead to important misunderstandings.
More than one telephone interpreter has translated ‘boyfriend’
as merely ‘friend’ in an asylum claim where the applicant feared
persecution on account of  his sexuality.
Case 7 was alleged to have given inconsistent information
concerning his relatives in Afghanistan:
When you left Afghanistan you had your parents, a 9 year old
brother and 5 year old sister and you have no other relatives.
(Screening Interview Q1.16). Alternatively you have 2
maternal uncles and an aunt in xxx district (Asylum
interview).
What is actually asked at Screening Interview Q1.16 is “Who
lived at home?” and although beneath the question it requires
the interviewing officer to ask for details of  “all extended family
that may have resided in a large rural area or nearby”, in
representatives’ experience this question is not always asked in
full, leading to the possibility that some family members are not
recorded through no fault of  the young person.
During 2013 Kent LIT started carrying out screening interviews
of  young people at Dover Eastern Docks, within a 5-day
window of  arrival. Local practitioners complained about the
short notice sometimes given52 since it is often too soon to
arrange legal representation to meet the client prior to
interview. In practitioners’ experience, there was a concern that
Social Services may not fully understand the legal gravity of
the situation, appearing to prioritise turnaround times rather
than ensuring that the child meets their legal representative
before the interview.
We conclude that if  the Home Office continue to adopt a
forensic approach to assessing the credibility of  children’s
claims, safeguards must be assured, including time to meet
their legal adviser before any interview, adequate interpreting,
a proper evidence trail and accurate recording of  the
interview, particularly in cases such as those from Afghanistan
where the credibility of  information provided about family
members is crucial to the claim.
2 Age assessments and credibility
Of our 20 clients social services departments assessed 16 of
them to be older than their claimed age. All except one were
accepted to be children although not the age they claimed to
be. The most common assessment of  age in our study was to
be 2 years older than claimed, with individuals who claimed to
be 14 or 15, assessed as 16 or 17. The second most common
assessment was to be assessed as 3 years older than
claimed. The round table discussion noted from their
experiences that it is particularly Afghan applicants who are
regularly assessed as older than they claim, sometimes by only
a few months, whereas other nationalities such as Eritrean
applicants are generally accepted to be the age they claim.
Our sample showed that Kent LIT often accept the Social
Services 1-page summary age assessment giving the child
an older age than claimed, without asking for or seeing the
full Merton-compliant age assessment. Clients are not
routinely provided with a full copy of  their age assessment,
making it more difficult for them to obtain advice on and
potentially challenge the conclusions. The participants at the
round table meeting noted that negative age assessments
were not promptly written up and given to the young people.
Instead requests have to go through the legal department
and often took several weeks to receive. In some cases
young people had been age assessed as adults and sent to
NASS accommodation in the North of  England, or even
detained, without legal advisers being informed, making it
very difficult to advise a client on their right to challenge the
assessment. Few of  the Kent age assessments in our sample
were formally challenged.
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It is of  course possible that some children and young people
are being advised by agents or others before their arrival to
claim a younger age, damaging what may otherwise be a
strong and truthful claim. However, if  Social Services are
incorrectly assessing children to be older than they are, the
consequences of  such an error goes beyond the type of
support that is provided. As we did not have access to all the
age assessments in our sample we cannot comment on the
legality or otherwise of  them. However, it is evident that a
negative age assessment is one of  the factors that can
significantly damage an asylum claim and lead to a negative
assessment of  credibility. It potentially affects whether an
asylum claim is accepted or not.
The Home Office published policy on age assessments53 states:
The [UK Border] Agency does not request local authority
age assessments to assess the credibility of  an applicant’s
asylum claim. However, case owners must consider all
evidence provided when making a decision on the asylum
claim, including information contained within an age
assessment. It is important to note that an age assessment
report is based on notes, rather than a verbatim record.
…Minor discrepancies between the age assessment and
information submitted to the Agency should, generally, not
be investigated further, nor relied upon.
If  it is considered appropriate to raise a credibility issue
identified within an age assessment, before a finding is
made, it must be put to the applicant (if  in person, in the
presence of  a responsible adult) and they must be given
the opportunity to explain or clarify the discrepancy in
question. (writers’ emphasis)
In Case 13, information from the age assessment was used to
allege a number of discrepancies and to suggest that the young
person was misleading the authorities. These points were not
put to the young person before the decision was made.
In Cases 10 and 11 the tribunal judges used the findings of  the
age assessment to find that the young people had ‘lied about
their age’ and therefore their asylum claims were not credible.
From the significant satellite litigation on age disputes, it is
clear that the science does not support age assessments
more accurate than plus or minus two years of  the assessed
age. Despite this, some tribunal judges made precise age
assessments of  only a few months difference from the
claimed age.
3 Asylum interviews
The initial research report did not cover the asylum interview
stage as we did not have access to every interview record.
However the round table discussed practitioners’ experiences,
including the writers’ own, of  Home Office interviews.
First, in the round table practitioners’ experience, the quality
of  interviewers and interpreters in Kent LIT is very variable.
Some officers are able to put the child/young person at ease
and ask the questions in a clear, straightforward way. Some
clearly structure the interview and appear to be asking
questions that are appropriate and relevant to determining the
asylum claim. In contrast other interviewing officers adopt a
very formal approach which does not put the young person at
ease. Practitioners reported having had to call a halt to
interviews on more than one occasion where repeated
unsympathetic questioning about a traumatic incident had
reduced the child to tears.
Case study
Case 14 arrived in the UK as a 15 year old claiming a fear of
being forcibly recruited to the Taliban. He was age
assessed as over 18 in a one page assessment which was
not Merton compliant. He was sent to adult NASS
accommodation. He did not receive any legal advice and
subsequently absconded from his accommodation. He was
then detained for 10 months during which time
arrangements were made for him to be removed to Greece.
Legal representatives challenged his age and his removal to
Greece by judicial review and he was subsequently
released from detention. He did not receive an asylum
interview until over 3 years after he had arrived by which
time he was 18 by his own account. No attempt was made
to trace his family, no consideration was given to his best
interests and his screening interviews were carried out
without appropriate safeguards. His account was
disbelieved by the Home Office and it was argued that in
any event as an adult he could internally relocate to Kabul.
On appeal it was accepted that he had been a minor on
arrival but his appeal was nevertheless dismissed. Had he
been correctly recognised as a minor from the start, he
could not have been detained, could not have been
considered for removal to Greece, and should have received
a prompt interview and decision. It is highly likely he would
have been granted discretionary leave, if  not refugee status
as an unaccompanied child.
CONTINUED OVERLEAF
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The round table noted that some young people endured very
long interviews, appearing to be far too long for a child’s
concentration. Representatives’ interpreters mention this after
the interview is over, having become aware that the child is no
longer paying attention, but feel they cannot comment. One
round table participant noted a general issue about cognition
levels of  children, ie that children have different levels of
understanding and knowledge, which is often not appreciated
by either practitioners or Home Office staff, with Social
Services often unwilling to provide educational assessments
to support this.
It was felt that the asylum interview stage cannot be analysed
separately from the refusal letter. Practitioners noted some
interviewers’ tendency to ‘interview to refuse’, where questions
were not focused on the actual issues at the core of the claim
but appear to be an opportunity to ask a series of questions in
order to find discrepancies compared to the witness statement,
or even to create discrepancies within the asylum interview itself.
It is recognised as good practice to put discrepancies to the
applicant to give them an opportunity to respond and some
interviewers were capable of doing this in a sensitive way
without appearing to accuse the applicant. This can allow for a
simple misunderstanding to be corrected. However, at times
interviewers put very minor discrepancies to an applicant in a
non-sensitive way which can only serve to increase the anxiety
of the young person and make them feel defensive. It was noted
that occasionally discrepancies were put to the young person in
a way that slightly misquoted or incorrectly paraphrased what
the young person had said in previous statements, making it
hard for them to respond meaningfully to the question.
Interpreters, whilst generally accurate, are heard to make
mistakes which if  not corrected could lead to the interviewing
officer continuing the interview questions based on a
misapprehension of  what had actually been said. Whilst some
interviewing officers are happy for the legal representative to
intervene if  they became aware that there is a significant
misunderstanding, others can become defensive and ask that
the legal representative strictly reserve any comments for the
end of  the interview.
One young person, who had crossed Europe hidden in a lorry
and not known at any point which country he was in, was
asked: ‘Were you unaware of  the lorry’s destination?’ but
answered ‘No’. After the representative had insisted that the
interviewer check straight away with the interpreter exactly what
he had asked, it turned out that question had been translated
more naturally as ‘did you know where the lorry was going?’ to
which the answer was indeed No. The interviewer agreed to
note the problem. This reinforces the need for the presence of
representatives and an independent interpreter at the interview.
4 The asylum decision: Home Office Reasons
for Refusal Letters
a Credibility
The UNHCR Quality Initiative Project Sixth Report, April 200954
had investigated the way in which asylum claims by
unaccompanied children are assessed in the UK. They noted
that in almost half  the decisions there was no explicit
consideration of  age in the credibility assessment. They noticed
a tendency for children to be required to ‘prove’ aspects of  their
claim, and disbelieved if  they could not provide enough
evidence; and a failure of  the Home Office to properly
understand and apply the benefit of  the doubt.
Almost all the cases we considered were refused on grounds
of incredibility or implausibility.
Case 1, aged 15, was refused in a 5 page refusal letter, which
disputed credibility because of  ‘a lack of  detail in his initial
application’. He had stated that he was being abused by family
members but had not said in his statement how often he was
abused, what he was abused with or why the abuse was
happening. No discrepancies or other credibility points were
raised. Subsequent Home Office policy guidance on assessing
claims of  young people states55:
13.1 General principles
…be aware that children do not often provide as much detail
as adults in recalling abusive experiences
Case 8 was criticised as he did not know the names and ethnic
origin of  the 3 Taliban who came to his home at night when his
father was killed. This was held to be inconsistent with the fact
that he was able to recognise them as Taliban.
Case 15’s father died when the applicant was 1 or 2 years old.
His refusal criticises him for being unable to provide any
information about his father’s time with the Taliban and being
unable to state precisely how old he was when his father died.
A number of  refusals tried to insinuate inconsistencies between
answers that the young person had given at different times
during the interview and between the interview and his earlier
statement, regularly using the term ‘Alternatively’ to create the
impression that the young person had given significantly
differing accounts. This was done without the young person’s
responses being placed in the context of  the specific questions
which they were answering. Although some of  the
discrepancies are real, on closer inspection many of  these
alleged discrepancies may be easily explained. This use of  the
term ‘alternatively’ appears to be a rhetorical technique which is
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being used for the effect which it creates on the reader of  the
refusal letter. The round table participants confirmed the
widespread use of  both this specific technique and a more
general use of  misleading allegations, which was felt to be
especially inappropriate in cases concerning children.
‘You were educated in a local mosque (Screening
Interview). Alternatively you never attended school as the
Taliban would not allow it’ (Witness statement).
This may easily be explained if  we appreciate that the young
person did not use the term ‘school’ for the mosque that he
attended.
‘You claimed your father worked at a military base and was
employed as [job 1]. (Asylum interview record). Alternatively,
you claim your father was previously employed as [job 2] but
left this job because he was threatened by the Taliban.
(Asylum interview record)’ (Case 7).
There is no discrepancy here, as it is clear from the rest of  the
interview that the applicant is referring to two different jobs that
his father did at different times.
As with adult claims, the fact that a child was able to avoid the
persecution was sometimes evidence that he was not at risk.
Case 5 was told:
‘…your claim that the Taliban were intent on harming you
specifically is inconsistent with their not having done so
before you had the opportunity to flee your home area…’
Some refusals use credibility problems in the applicant’s
account of  his journey to the UK to dispute the core of  the
claim. In a case where no specific credibility issues were
raised, the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of  Claimants)
Act (AI(TC)A) 2004 s8 was applied where an applicant had
passed through Greece without claiming asylum. This was
taken to have damaged his credibility, despite his young age at
the time and to the particular difficulties that asylum seekers
face in Greece.56
More recent refusal letters in the sample did note that they were
assessing the credibility of  a child, and stated that they had
applied a more liberal benefit of  the doubt and relied more on
objective background evidence, in accordance with UNHCR
guidance. For example, the refusal in Case 6 stated ‘greater
dispensation has been given to you throughout the asylum
claim as a result of  the understanding that you are a minor and
that the problem of  proof  is compounded in the case of
children’.
In Case 10 this principle seems to have been understood:
‘Whilst it is considered that you have presented no objective
evidence to support this claim, objective evidence shows
there was ongoing fighting in [P] in 2004. Due to your age
the benefit of  the doubt has been given to you on this matter
and as such it is accepted that your father died in 2004’
However, other refusal letters simply incorporated the formal
wording into the letter without applying it.
Case 7, whose father disappeared when he was 10, was found
lacking in credibility because he could not give the name of  his
father’s workplace. His father had disappeared, and colleagues
had suggested that the Taliban had taken him. The refusal letter
states:
‘You have adduced no evidence to support the view that
your father had been taken by the Taliban, and it is pure
speculation on the part of  the other employees at [X] that he
had been taken by the Taliban’. (writers’ emphasis)
‘In reaching this conclusion due regard has been given to
your age and claimed level of  education’
Refusal letters frequently note the failure of  a child to ‘adduce
evidence’ of  matters where it is difficult to think what evidence
could be provided other than the child’s testimony.
Case 14’s father died when he was 10 years old. His refusal
letter stated:
‘It has not been possible to obtain evidence that your father
was the leader of  the Taliban where you lived. It is therefore
not accepted that you have demonstrated sufficient
evidence to support your claim that your father was involved
with the Taliban as claimed’.
‘…The claim that your father was involved with Taliban and
died is based on information provided to you by your mother
and is therefore considered to be subjective. You have
adduced no evidence to support your claim to have an
objectively well-founded fear…’
b ‘implausibilities’
While in some cases there were clear inconsistencies which
may lead a reasonable person to question the young person’s
account, in others negative credibility findings have been
reached based on the caseowner’s own speculations about
how a particular individual in another culture would or should
have acted:
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The Home Office provides clear guidance on addressing
credibility57 noting in particular:
Decision makers should never use speculation to reject a
material fact. In Y v Secretary of  State [2006] EWCA Civ
1223, the court advises decision makers to avoid
conclusions based on how they believe the applicant or a
third party ought to have behaved. After all this is simply a
matter of  personal opinion.
Any decision not to apply the benefit of  the doubt to a
material claimed fact that is otherwise internally credible
must be based on reasonably drawn, objectively justifiable,
inferences. Decision makers must never make adverse
credibility findings by constructing their own theory of  how a
particular event may have unfolded, or how they think the
applicant, or a third party, ought to have behaved.
Yet it is evident that this guidance is not followed in some cases:
‘...It is considered that if  [your relative] did not trust the
agents with your sister then he also would not take the risk of
sending you, a young boy who he cares about, with these
men…’ (Case 3)
‘It is considered that if  your mother knew that her husband
was a commander of  the Taliban and that his usual base
was the madrassa that if  your mother did not want you to be
associated with the Taliban that she would have arranged
your education at another location and therefore it is not
accepted that your mother allowed you to attend the
madrassa and consequently it is not accepted that you were
educated in the madrassa…’ (Case 10)
c Failure properly to consider the Refugee
Convention or humanitarian protection
The UNHCR Report noted the Home Office failure to apply the
Refugee Convention in an appropriate and child-specific way
and failing to consider the difficulties a child would face in
attempting to access adequate protection.
The length and detail of  the refusal letters in our study varied.
A number of  refusal letters from 2009 and earlier were brief,
around 5-6 pages, and dealt with the claim primarily by finding
the young person not credible without adequately considering
the claim as that of  a child. There was no consideration of  the
risks faced by a child returning alone, or relocating as a child,
or any consideration of  subsidiary protection under the
Qualification Directive. In contrast some more recent refusal
letters, particularly those from Kent LIT, were more than 30
pages long and addressed all aspects of  the claim in
considerable detail. Those refusals did in general note that
they were considering the claim of  a minor and quoted
UNHCR and Home Office guidance on how claims from
minors should be considered.
However, large tracts of  those letters consist of  lengthy
quotations from caselaw and objective evidence which were
not always relevant or applied to the facts of  the case.
For example, one applicant mentioned in his asylum interview
that he suffered from headaches, depression and anxiety.
Two whole pages of  his refusal discussed Article 3 ECHR
medical claims, including long quotes from N v UK and
reference to D v UK, though it is evident that medical grounds
were not being advanced as the basis of  his claim.
If  the longer letters showed a more thorough Home Office
consideration of  asylum claims, it would be welcomed.
However, a 30-page refusal letter featuring extensive passages
of caselaw that are not applied to the specific facts, or indeed
are clearly not relevant, cannot be in a child’s best interests. An
experienced legal representative would identify the important
legal and factual issues. But a young person without legal
representation, or even their social worker, may be intimidated
by the length and apparent legal erudition and believe it to be
unchallengeable.58
In only 9 of  our cases did the Home Office consider whether
the child was a member of a particular social group, following
LQ. In only some cases where a client’s family were involved in
a blood feud was the client identified as potentially belonging to
a particular social group. In Case 3, the refusal letter relied on
Skenderaj59 rather than the more recent case of  Fornah60 to
reject the claim.
Most refusals found that there was a sufficiency of protection
or that internal relocation to Kabul was safe for the young
person, relying on standard paragraphs from Horvath61 and
Januzi,62 RQ (Afghanistan)63 and country information extracts,
without relating either the cases or the country information to
the particular facts of  the client’s case. In 2009 the UNHCR had
highlighted the lack of  child-sensitive reasoning when
considering internal relocation.64 Yet refusals seen from 2012
still do not properly determine the best interests of  the child
when considering internal relocation. In Case 6, assessed as
16 and with evident but undiagnosed comprehension issues,
the refusal stated: ‘you are considered to be a fit and healthy
individual who can reasonably be expected to support himself
upon return as an adult’.
Refusals did not generally consider Humanitarian Protection.
In 2011 only 10 out of  1356 initial decisions for minors were
granted humanitarian protection, including only one from
Afghanistan.65 This amounts to 0.7% of initial decisions and is
surprising given there is significant objective evidence
documenting the widespread general violence that children
and young people can be subjected to in Afghanistan.
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This appears to show a lack of  appreciation of  the complex
reasons why young people are leaving Afghanistan and that an
individual’s journeys may be motivated by a combination of
protection needs and economic reasons.
d Best interests of the child
Article 3(1) of  the UN Convention of  the Rights of  the Child
states that:
‘In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by a
public or private welfare institutions, courts of  law,
administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best
interests of  the child shall be a primary consideration’.
When the UK ratified the Convention in December 1991 it
entered a reservation to allow it not to apply the convention to
decisions concerning young people and children subject to
immigration control. This changed in November 2008 when the
UK, following domestic and international pressure, removed the
reservation.
The principle is that young people should be treated as
children first and migrants second, and that ascertaining their
best interests is a primary consideration when making an
immigration decision that affects them. This principle has been
introduced into primary legislation in the Borders, Citizenship
and Immigration Act 2009 s55. In ZH (Tanzania)67 the Supreme
Court gave clear guidance on how decision-makers should
approach the consideration of  a child’s best interests. In that
judgment Lord Kerr stated emphatically (para 46):
‘…Where the best interests of  the child clearly favour a
certain course, that course should be followed unless
countervailing reasons of  considerable force displace
them…’
However, it is questionable whether this duty is being carried
out.
Nine of  our clients’ first refusals were made before the 2009 Act
came into force. In only 5 of  the remaining cases were the ‘best
interests of  the child’ mentioned. Consideration was often very
brief, the facts of  the individual case were not specifically
considered, and in only two did the decision-maker make a
determination of  the child’s best interests.
Case 7 was found not credible and told that in any event he
would receive protection in Afghanistan or could internally
relocate to avoid a fear of  forcible recruitment to the Taliban. A
single paragraph is given to his ‘best interests’, stating:
‘In coming to this decision, regard has been given to the
statutory guidance to the UK Border Agency on making
arrangements to safeguard and promote the welfare of
children, “Every Child Matters: Change for Children”, issued
under s55 of  the Borders, Immigration and Citizenship Act
2009. Your general needs have been considered and no
specific matters requiring consideration have been identified
other than the need to ensure you have access to suitable
medical care whilst resident in the UK’.
For one client his best interests were determined to be ‘to return
to Afghanistan where you would be able to continue living with
people from your own ethnicity and community’ – and then he
was then granted 13 months’ discretionary leave on the basis
of  inadequate reception conditions in Afghanistan.68 For
another it was to be granted 3 years discretionary leave (at the
age of  13) with a view to return to Afghanistan when adequate
reception facilities become available. Given the current situation
in Afghanistan, that is unlikely to be soon. It is questionable
whether an uncertain immigration status could truly be the best
interests of  a child aged 13.
Several refusal letters sought to distinguish the facts of  the
young person’s case from the lead cases of  LD69 and ZH
(Tanzania) – (cases which concern family life and not
unaccompanied children). However, the refusal letters failed to
make a determination of  the particular child’s best interests, or
explain why it should be overruled by the public interest of
immigration control.
In the subsequent refusals of  HPDL applications many of  the
young people were by then over 18 and thus were not subject
to a further ‘best interests’ consideration.
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Case 19 described how his whole family except for him and
his father had been killed, how there was still fighting
between Taliban and British forces in his area, and that his
father had sent him away as he was unable to keep him
safe. His claim was not considered under Article 15c of  the
Qualification Directive. He was deemed to be an economic
migrant, despite the refusal letter’s citing the UNHCR
handbook66 definition at para 62: ‘a person who is motivated
by exclusively economic consideration is an economic
migrant’ (writers’ emphasis).
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But Case 10, who was 17 and 10 months and therefore still a
child, was told in a confusing section of  his refusal letter that
‘you would then no longer meet the UN Convention definition
of a child’ and therefore the caselaw of  DS ‘will no longer
be applicable in your case’. This same argument appears
in Case 18, another 17 year old who was told that he ‘would no
longer meet the definition of  a child’. Those decision-makers
effectively decided that the s55 duty gradually fades away as
the child approaches 18 – or that it did not matter, since the
applicant would not be removed until he was over 18.70
A round table participant noted instances where best interests
arguments were used against the applicant, where a request to
delay a decision to wait for further evidence was refused, on the
basis that it was in the child’s best interests to achieve a quick
decision.
In a number of  recent cases the higher courts have questioned
the appropriateness of  a Home Office policy which assumes
that discretionary leave is necessarily in the best interests of  a
young child. SM & Ors v Secretary of  State for the Home
Department [2013] EWHC 1144 concerned accompanied
children who were aged between 6 and 10 years old. It was
accepted that a blanket policy of  granting successive periods
of 30 months discretionary leave to children whose future was
likely to be in the UK did not comply with the s55 duty to have
regards to their best interests. These children had been allowed
to remain on Article 8 grounds so it had been recognised that
they were likely to remain in the UK. Importantly though, it was
acknowledged that it cannot be in the best interests for young
children to grow up with the anxiety caused by the need to
make regular and uncertain applications for DL in order to
remain in the UK.71
This approach suggests that ‘best interests’ considerations
should more fully take into account the need to find a durable
solution for those who arrive in the U.K at a young age and who
are unlikely to be able to be reunited with their family.72
e The tracing of family members
Our cases show that the Home Office does not have a
consistent approach to the issue of  tracing, but their admitted
inability to trace families in Afghanistan does not stop the
issue being used to provide further reasons for refusal.
Following the judgment in KA (Afghanistan), the Home Office
issued guidance73 which sets out to caseowners the duty to
trace family members as soon as possible after the claim for
asylum is made. It advises that family tracing duties may entail
contacting the family by telephone, contacting the family via a
village elder following assistance from the British Embassy or
High Commission, or commissioning a third party such as the
High Commission or tracing organisation to undertake tracing.
In cases where decisions had yet to be made or where
appeals were pending the Home Office began asking clients if
they would like assistance to trace their family members. This
led to decisions being withdrawn in some cases awaiting a
strong appeal, leading to a further delay before a new decision
was issued.
Most of  the cases in our sample were from the time period
where the Home Office was systematically failing to attempt any
tracing of family members. This means they were all potentially
within the scope of  the judgment of KA.
In Case 10 the refusal simply stated:
Family Tracing
The findings of  DS (Afghanistan) v SSHD [2011] EWCA Civ
30574 [concerning the duty to trace] have been considered
with regards to your claim. You stated that social services
have offered to help you send a letter if  you wanted to.
More recently the Home Office has addressed this issue,
providing a ‘tracing proforma’ and asking the child if  they would
like assistance to trace their family, but in no case was there any
evidence that the Home Office had taken any steps to assist
with tracing beyond advising the client about the Red Cross
Tracing Service. Case 7’s refusal acknowledged that tracing in
Afghanistan is beyond the ability of  the UK Government at
present:
‘Unfortunately due to the size of  the staff  in the Foreign and
Commonwealth office in Kabul it is not possible to trace
people in Afghanistan. However, once resources become
available attempts will be made to trace your family …’
Another refusal (Case 6) stated:
In respect of  family tracing in Afghanistan, UKBA have
contacted the Afghan government to establish if  they have a
national database of  their citizens. The Afghan government
have confirmed that at present time that they do not hold a
national database. The FCO is not currently resourced to
permit further enquiries at this time, but will endeavour to
assist if  you wish them to do so if  resources allow in future.
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Yet the inability of  the UK to trace the family is not held to
prevent the young person from making their own tracing efforts,
and if  they do, they must be able to return.
‘It is noted that you claim not to know the whereabouts of
your family within Afghanistan and it is noted that you have
attempted to contact your family via the Red Cross…. It is
therefore considered that you are trying to locate your family
and that you can be reunited with them upon your return to
Afghanistan’.
Several young people ‘declining’ assistance with tracing had
this turned against them. Case 12 declined an offer of  help
tracing his family as he was in contact with them and knew that
they were residing illegally in [country X]. He was criticised in
the refusal letter for ‘failing to adduce evidence that they were
illegally resident in [X]’. He later maintained he had thought that
the offer of  help to trace his family was a genuine offer of  help
which he did not need. He did not realise he had to agree to
tracing in order to allow the UKBA to contact them to verify their
status. The tribunal judge in his case also blamed the young
person for not providing the Home Office with the information
they needed to trace his family.
In contrast, Case 17 was told in his refusal letter that as he had
confirmed in his asylum interview that he was in contact with his
mother, the case of  DS (and hence the Home Office duty to
trace) did not apply to him.
In Case 13 the Home Office transfers the blame for their
inability to trace family members on to the child. In this case the
young person had provided the name of  his village (there was
no house number or street number) but the Home Office
claimed that they were unable to locate it using two websites.
The refusal letter stated:
It is considered that you have failed to provide complete and
accurate information with sufficient detail with which UKBA
could endeavour to trace your family after you lost contact
with them. It is considered that you have failed to discharge
the duty placed on you in KA. (writers’ emphasis)
(A simple internet search by these writers confirmed the
location of  the client’s village from the information he had
provided to the Home Office).
We conclude that the problems noted by the UNHCR in the
assessment of  young peoples’ asylum claims were prevalent in
our study and have arguably led to a number of  young people
receiving inadequate decisions. The round table participants all
agreed that there is a clear tendency for the Home Office in
refusal letters to use the tracing issue against applicants.
5 Legal representation
Upon arrival young people claiming asylum are generally
referred by Social Services or immigration officials to one or
other local legal aid firm. The largest legal aid immigration
provider in Kent, Refugee and Migrant Justice, went into
administration in July 2010, and as a result their clients had to
be transferred to alternative providers. In some cases the
young people’s files were transferred to London firms. From our
sample, a client of  another local provider which closed down
had a period with no representative, and then 2 further
representatives. Several of  the young people in our sample had
sought legal advice from 2, 3 or more legal representatives
during the course of  their asylum claim. The 20 cases we
examined therefore contained examples of  work from a range
of legal aid providers, some local and some from further afield.
It has long been recognised that good quality legal advice at an
early opportunity can have a decisive impact on asylum
claims.75 The Immigration Law Practitioners Association (ILPA)
best practice recommendations and evidence from other
studies emphasise the need for legal representatives to build
the client’s case from the beginning. This arguably requires:
• working diligently with the client on their initial asylum
statements, dealing with all discrepancies and illegalities
arising from any earlier interviews;
• advising them in detail and preparing them fully for their
asylum interview;
• making immediate representations after the interview to deal
with any ‘discrepancies’ which arose during the interview;
• providing relevant supporting objective information.
ILPA has commented that the asylum and immigration system
has the least formal specialised provision for young people.76 A
Refugee Council report77 found that the quality of  legal
representation received by separated children is extremely
varied – and young people are not generally able themselves to
recognise poor practice. Problems identified include legal
representatives’ lack of  experience in interviewing children,
lack of  understanding of  child-specific forms of  persecution,
and the failure to explain complex issues in a way that children
can understand. Further, there is little joined-up provision of
advice in immigration and community care. Not all immigration
caseworkers can advise on challenging age assessments, and
some young people do not receive adequate or any advice on
their right to challenge them.
CONTINUED OVERLEAF
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a Not appealing the first refusal
In our sample, 10 out of  12 clients who could have appealed
their first refusal, all represented at the time, did not appeal. Of
these 1 subsequently obtained another legal representative
who challenged a formal refusal of  funding and appealed out
of  time. The others had waited until they were refused an
extension of  their discretionary leave before appealing. Of the 2
who did appeal their first refusal of  asylum, one had no choice
as he had not been granted any leave.
Of the 17 clients who were granted a right of  appeal following
the refusal of  an extension of  leave, all appealed the refusal,
including those who had previously not appealed when they
had the opportunity. 13 of  these clients were subsequently
represented at appeal, 4 of  whom by firms who took on the
cases after they had been merits failed78 by other firms.
Evidently some advisers recommend accepting the grant of  DL
until 17 ½ and advising the young person that if  they are
subsequently refused further leave, they can appeal against
that refusal. However where the young person is over 18 when
next refused, representatives often then assess the merits of
the case as less than 50% and cease to represent them.
At the point of  refusal of  further leave, these applicants have
lost the advantages of  having their claims considered by a
judge while they are still a child. This is of  particular importance
for those from countries such as Afghanistan where belonging
to the ‘particular social group’ of  unaccompanied or orphaned
children amounts to a Convention ground, while country
guidance cases assert that it is safe for adults over 18 to return.
Because of  these legal findings, young people from
Afghanistan are less likely to succeed on a subsequent appeal
than if  they had appealed the initial decision.
Furthermore, the Home Office evidently consider a failure to
appeal the first refusal as an acceptance of  its terms. Typical
paragraphs in subsequent refusals of  applications for further
leave read:
‘It is also noted that you did not appeal against the decision
to refuse your asylum claim, and it is considered therefore
that you accepted the reasons contained within the RFR
letter dated XXX.’
‘You had a right of  appeal against this decision which you
did not exercise and it is therefore considered that you
accepted the reasons for refusal as contained within that
letter” (Case 12).
b Merits assessment
Some clients had been merits failed at the first refusal stage,
either because ‘a Convention reason could not be identified’, or
because of  ‘poor performance’ in their Home Office interview
and poor credibility allegations. One provider’s CW4 decision79
stated that it was in the client’s best interests not to appeal.
Legal Services Commission guidance allowed legal
representatives to consider the merits of  a child’s asylum
appeal differently from an adult’s case. If  a Convention reason
can be clearly identified CLR should normally be granted to a
child,80 since their case will satisfy the merits test to at least
‘borderline’.81 Providers should therefore not be refusing CLR
just because the Home Office disputes the applicant’s
credibility.
Different providers have evidently been taking a different
approach to assessing the merits of  children’s appeals, with
some being prepared to take on appeals that other firms have
rejected. Furthermore, some firms are willing to take on and
make fresh claims following the dismissal of  an appeal and the
refusal of  further legal aid by a previous representative.
However it is unfortunate that young people are forced to move
from one legal aid provider to another in order to receive
representation for an appeal.
At the round table discussion we explored the reasons why
representatives may advise a young person against appealing.
It emerged that some social workers and support workers are
concerned that forcing a young person to give evidence before
an immigration tribunal would not be in their interests: and
some representatives are concerned that any negative findings
made in a first appeal would irretrievably damage any later
appeal, following the Devaseelan82 guidelines. However the
majority of  round table participants held that it is almost always
an advantage for nationals of  countries such as Afghanistan
who have arguable asylum claims to go before a tribunal based
on the risks faced by a returning child, and for the appeal to be
heard at a time closer to the events which led to his decision to
flee their country. Success rates from practitioners’ experiences
in such ‘first appeals’ were reported to be overwhelmingly
higher than in appeals against refusals of  further leave.83 It was
also noted that Social Services’ task of  looking after these
children is more straightforward where the children win an
appeal and obtain refugee leave.
The round table participants put in a strong plea for
representatives to represent their client, to take their instructions
carefully in a way and at a level appropriate to the child, and not
to act as a quasi-judge, for example referring to an applicant’s
‘poor performance’ in their asylum interview or their ‘failure’ to
provide any evidence for their claim.
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Examples of merits failed cases
These examples show that in some cases representatives are
failing to identify appropriate Convention reasons or other legal
arguments, and applying the wrong standard of  proof in
adopting the Home Office demand for evidence.
Common problems in case preparation
Referring to the standard ILPA Best Practice literature85 and to
each client’s formal documents, we identified the following
issues:
• Lack of  detail in SEF or accompanying statements;
• Providing a document (such as a Taskera86) without evidence
of how it was obtained, or without any prior independent
check on whether the document was genuine;
• Providing no objective supporting evidence;
• Failing to identity which Convention reason or humanitarian
protection ground was engaged, or wrongly stating the
applicable test; not giving detailed reasons on internal
relocation or lack of  sufficiency of  protection, no detailed
application of  cases such as LQ Afghanistan, or relevant
Home Office guidance, no detailed application of  the ‘best
interest’ duties to the child. In none of  our cases, even where
the child claimed to be 13 or 14, was it argued that a grant of
discretionary leave until 17½ might not be in their best
interests.
• Not obtaining the local authority’s age assessment as soon
as possible after the beginning of  the case; only challenging
the age assessment on an appeal against a refusal of  further
leave.
• Providing little or no further evidence or argument with
applications for further leave.
• Failing to pursue apparent errors of  law: in two cases the
appellants had been found credible, under 18 and at risk on
return at the date of  hearing, but the appeals dismissed
because the appellants would not be returned until they were
adults. In neither case was this error of  law pursued.
Case 17 was assessed on arrival as 16. He submitted his
Afghan ID card, but the Home Office rejected the
document. It is not clear if  he was advised on challenging
his age assessment. His asylum claim was that his father
was deceased, he had lost contact with his mother and he
had been mistreated and feared being killed by other family
members who wished to take his land. He was refused
asylum but given just over 1 year’s discretionary leave with a
right of  appeal. He was told by his representatives that the
Home Office had decided that his claim did not engage the
Convention, that his cousins could not be regarded as
viable actors of  persecution, and that he could internally
relocate to avoid them. He was refused legal aid and told
that he would have to pay for representation at an appeal.
If  he had appealed and been accepted as credible, he
should have been found to be at risk as an unaccompanied
child, and relocation to Kabul to be unsafe. However he did
not appeal, and his application for further leave was refused.
He appealed against this and was granted funding by
different representatives who also obtained a medical age
assessment. His appeal was heard nearly 2 years after he
had arrived in the UK by which time he was over 18
according to his assessed age. He was found to be an adult,
his claim was not believed and his appeal was dismissed.
Case 19 was assessed by KSS as 16½ (he claimed 15). He
feared indiscriminate violence in Afghanistan, after his family
and home were destroyed in a rocket attack. He had no
contact with any other family and lived in a particular volatile
area of  Afghanistan. He was advised that his claim did not
engage the Refugee Convention, and that to qualify for
Humanitarian Protection he would need to show ‘a sustained
pattern or campaign of  persecution directed at him which
was knowingly tolerated by the authorities, or which they
could not protect him from’. No consideration was given to
Article 15c Qualification Directive84 or to child-specific forms
of  persecution as in LQ Afghanistan. The Home Office had
made no attempts to trace his family. He was refused
funding to appeal, and advised to wait to apply for an
extension of  leave. That was refused, and he was then
granted funding by different solicitors to appeal that refusal.
He is now over 18 on his own claimed age and his appeal
has still not been heard.
Case 11 claimed to be 15½ when he arrived in the UK. He
was age assessed as 17. He feared being killed as a result
of  a family blood feud in which he feared being targeted in a
revenge killing. He was refused funding, his representative
advising that his claim did not engage the Convention, that
he had ‘failed to demonstrate’ that he could not relocate
within Afghanistan, and there was ‘a lack of  evidence’ for his
claim. Different representatives granted funding and
represented at his appeal.
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Other studies provide confirmation that many children are
being wrongly advised at this stage.87 The Refugee Council’s
own advisers felt that some representatives seemed to feel
there was less need to make a strong case for young people,
as almost all are granted DL until 17½.88 They noted that
children are often told they have no chance of  winning their
appeal, and are merits failed by their representative, requiring
a desperate search for alternative legal advice. In some cases
children are being advised to accept their discretionary leave
to remain, and to wait to make an extension application,
without being advised that the likelihood of  an extension
application being granted is small.
6 Tribunal determinations89
There is currently a right of  appeal against refusal of  asylum for
minors who have been refused asylum with no leave to remain,
or who have been refused asylum but granted discretionary
leave for over a year.90 In 8 of  our cases the young person was
refused but granted discretionary leave for less than a year and
had no right of  appeal. To have their cases considered by an
independent tribunal, those young people had to wait until they
were 17 ½, apply for an extension of  leave, wait for a refusal
and then appeal that refusal.91 In most of  our sample, by the
time any appeal was heard the appellants had turned 18 and
were thus no longer considered a child.
Of those who did appeal their first refusal some were allowed
on a technical ground and referred back for a further decision
from the Home Office. Some were allowed on the basis that the
Home Office had not relied on a Merton-compliant age
assessment when assessing age. In these cases, after a delay,
a further decision was made simply relying on the original
refusal. In others the case was allowed because the decision
was a dual decision (ie both a decision to refuse to vary leave
and a removal decision taken under the Immigration and
Asylum Act (IAA) 2006 s47) and so was arguably unlawful.92
Again there was a lengthy delay before a further decision was
made, and so those appellants too were over 18 by the time
their appeals were heard.
For all of  these reasons, potential child refugees are being
denied a prompt and effective remedy against defective Home
Office decisions.
Case C received a decision early in 2010. He appealed and the
appeal was allowed and remitted back to the Secretary of  State
as a Merton-compliant age assessment was not before the
judge. However a new decision was not made until over a year
later. The application was refused and he had to appeal again.
Case A received a decision in early 2012. That decision was
withdrawn after an appeal was allowed on the dual decision
point and remitted to the Secretary of  State. A new refusal
decision was not made for six months.
We do not believe that it can be in a child’s best interests, and
it is not in accordance with Home Office policy on the
handling of  claims by unaccompanied children, for this kind
of  delay to occur. There is no good reason why a decision
which clearly received careful Home Office consideration
immediately before a hearing date could not be remade within
a few weeks.
The problem of  dual decisions has now been addressed by the
amendment to s47 IAA 2006 made by s51 Crime and Courts
Act 2013. However, delays arising from Home Office failure to
obtain Merton-compliant age assessments have not been
addressed.
It was evident that judges have not been taking a consistent
approach to the lack of  a Merton-complaint assessment. Some
proceed with the substantive appeal, accepting the client’s
account of  his age in the absence of  a Merton-compliant
assessment (Case W), others accept the Social Services age
assessment even though a Merton-compliant age assessment
was not produced (Case A), and others remit the case for a
new decision to be made on the basis of  a full age assessment
(Case C).
a Most appeals dismissed for ‘incredibility’ and
‘implausibility’
Our sample showed tribunal judges’ heavy reliance on
‘inconsistencies and implausibilities’ to dismiss young people’s
asylum appeals. Summarising the 14 cases with dismissed
appeals, if  we put aside case I, where the Determination refers
to ‘a significant, unarguable inconsistency’, and Case X (found
to be ‘inconsistent and incoherent’), the remaining clients’
appeals were dismissed for:
• ‘vagueness’ (Case T, who was unrepresented);
• incredibility (Cases D, B, Q (who was unrepresented) and W);
• implausibility (Cases P, C, A, E, V, S).
While some of  the ‘incredible’ and ‘implausible’ findings were
foreseeable, and some applicants may have been better served
by more thorough case preparation or an appeal against an
earlier refusal, we believe that many people both outside and
inside the immigration and asylum law environment would be
bemused by some of  the tribunal judges’ reasoning and leaps
in logic. We believe that if  the UNHCR guidelines on assessing
children’s asylum claims had been fully followed the outcomes
may have been different.
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What is remarkable, and most damaging for the appellants, is
the seeming ease with which different tribunal judges move
from arguably reasonable negative findings (‘you have not
shown to the requisite standard of  proof  that you have lost
touch with your family’) not just to a positive finding that the
appellant ‘is in contact’ with his family, but a clear finding that he
could definitely rejoin them and return home. Similarly, an
appellant found not to be at risk on return ‘must’ be an
economic migrant, and appellants assessed as older than their
claimed age must have ‘lied’ about their age.
One appeal was dismissed even though the Appellant was
believed:
Case F: (Appeal v 2nd decision; advised not to appeal 1st
decision. No new evidence or argument provided with 2nd
application). He was found by the tribunal judge to be under 18
at the date of  hearing and at risk from Taliban in his home area.
Nevertheless his appeal was dismissed ‘because by the time
he would be returned, he would be over 18 and could be safely
returned to Afghanistan’.
Three cases were appealed to the Upper Tribunal (UT):
Case G: This appeal had been allowed, as the Appellant was
believed to be at risk in his home area, and that it would be
unreasonably harsh to expect a child to relocate to Kabul. The
SSHD appealed to the UT on the basis that the IJ’s finding that
the Appellant had been inconsistent about evidence of  trying to
trace his family meant that the finding that he could not safely
relocate was an error of  law. The UT so found, and his
application to the Court of  Appeal was briskly dismissed.
Case B: appealed to UT on the grounds that insufficient weight
had been given to the appellant’s medical report. Permission
was refused by FTTIAC but granted by UTIAC, but the appeal
dismissed: no error of  law.
Case F: This case was appealed to the UT on the basis of not
seeing the full Merton -compliant age assessment. Permission
was granted but the case dismissed on the basis that, in fact, the
Appellant’s solicitor had previously seen the age assessment, but
had not challenged it. No one, including two UT judges and two
firms of solicitors, noticed a different arguable error of law.
b How did the Tribunal deal with the tracing issue?
Case G: At the first-tier tribunal, the Appellant’s account was
found to be broadly consistent, and the Respondent’s
arguments on discrepancies and alleged implausibilities not to
be compelling. He was found to be at risk on return, on the
basis that he was at risk in his home area, and that his
relocation to Kabul, as a minor, was held not to be reasonable.
But the IJ had also found there to be a discrepancy between
his claim that he had tried to trace his family and the written
evidence which showed only that an appointment had been
made with the Red Cross. 
The Secretary of State appealed, and the UT found that the
Appellant had not shown, as required by HK and others,93 that
his family could not be traced and would not be able to meet
him and care for him on return, and therefore ‘he has family
whom, in the absence of  credible evidence to the contrary, I find
would be available to him on return and will provide him with
assistance’. Additionally, by the time the UT decided the case,
he was an adult. The Appellant applied to the Court of  Appeal,
but was briskly dismissed, with an order prohibiting a request for
an oral hearing or any application to the Supreme Court.
Comment: this case in particular demonstrates the clear
conflict between the determination in HK and others, which
appears to place the burden of  family tracing on the minor, and
KA, which shows that the burden lies clearly on the Secretary
of  State. It also shows the great logical leap from finding that
someone has not shown that their family cannot be traced, to
their definitely having family who could definitely meet him and
care for him on return.
Case P: The tracing issue was considered in detail with
reference to KA, concluding: ‘I find that the appellant is at the
latter end of  the spectrum,94 in that he has lied about his age,
provided a fabricated asylum claim which contained no detail
as to the address, contact details or whereabouts of  any of  his
surviving relatives…’
Case A: In relation to the tracing duty, the Appellant explained
that he had not completed the form provided by the
Respondent, since he did not need help with tracing his family,
because he knew where they were and was in contact with
them. This answer led to the Immigration Judge deciding that
‘he had not adduced .. evidence that his family had not been
registered with [another country X’s] authorities to acquire legal
status there’, and finding
‘ no reason why, upon enquiry by the Respondent, the
Appellant could not have at once provided such particulars
as he had of  the family’s whereabouts in [X], demonstrating
the credibility of  the claims made by him as to their
whereabouts and the legitimacy or otherwise of  their stay in
[X]. I find that the reasons for failing to provide those
particulars, which draw upon fine distinctions for a young
man who claims he was uneducated, illiterate and
innumerate, further undermine his plausibility and
credibility..’
The tribunal in Case E relied on HK and others to make the
logical jump from ‘you have not proved you cannot contact with
your family’ to ‘you are in contact with your family and can rely
on them when returned home’.
The next section examines how the Courts have dealt with the
family tracing issue since KA.
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1 Court of Appeal judgments: EU
(Afghanistan)95 and afterwards
All our clients potentially came within the scope of  KA. However,
following the start of  this project, the court in EU (Afghanistan)
decided the remaining 6 appeals heard in KA. This judgment,
delivered by Sir Stanley Burnton LJ, noted disapproval at the
principle established by Rashid, took a very restrictive
approach to the reasoning in KA, and dismissed the remaining
appeals. We now critically discuss in detail the legal reasoning
of the Court of  Appeal in both KA and EU and in subsequent
cases.
The critical paragraph in KA (Afghanistan) (para 25) introduced
the ‘hypothetical spectrum’:
… There is a hypothetical spectrum. At one end is an
applicant who gives a credible and cooperative account of
having no surviving family in Afghanistan or of  having lost
touch with surviving family members and having failed,
notwithstanding his best endeavours, to re-establish contact.
It seems to me that, even if  he has reached the age of  18 by
the time his appeal is considered by the tribunal, he may,
depending on the totality of  the established facts, have the
basis of  a successful appeal by availing himself  of  the
Rashid/S principle and/or section 55 by reference to the
failure of  the Secretary of  State to discharge the duty to
endeavour to trace. In such a case Ravichandran would not
be an insurmountable obstacle. At the other end of  the
spectrum is an applicant whose claim to have no surviving
family in Afghanistan is disbelieved and in respect of  whom
it is found that he has been uncooperative so as to frustrate
any attempt to trace his family. In such a case, again
depending on the totality of  established facts, he may have
put himself  beyond the bite of  the protective and corrective
principle. This would not be because the law seeks to
punish him for his mendacity but because he has failed to
prove the risk on return and because there would be no
causative link between the Secretary of  State’s breach of
duty and his claim to protection. Whereas, in the first case,
the applicant may have lost the opportunity of  corroborating
his evidence about the absence of  support in Afghanistan
by reference to a negative result from the properly
discharged duty to endeavour to trace, in the second case
he can establish no such disadvantage. At this stage, when
we have not heard oral submissions on the facts of  their
cases, it is inappropriate to say where on the spectrum each
of  these appellants lies.
The court allowed one appeal, leaving the remaining cases to
be decided on their individual facts at a further hearing. EU
(Afghanistan), heard by a differently-constituted Court of
Appeal including Kay LJ, decided the remaining 6 appeals
heard in KA. Each was held to fall at the wrong end of  Kay LJ’s
‘hypothetical spectrum’ having been found by the tribunal to
have given untrue accounts, or otherwise been uncooperative in
relation to tracing their families.
Sir Stanley Burnton LJ stated in para 6:
‘…I do not think that the Court should require or encourage
the Secretary of  State to grant leave in circumstances either
in order to mark the Court’s displeasure at her conduct, or as
a sanction for her misconduct…’
In para 10 he stated:
Lastly, I should mention a point made by the Secretary of
State which I consider to have substance. Unaccompanied
children who arrive in this country from Afghanistan have
done so as a result of  someone, presumably their families,
paying for their fare and/or for a so-called agent to arrange
their journey to this country. The costs incurred by the family
will have been considerable, relative to the wealth of  the
average Afghan family. The motivation for their incurring that
cost may be that their child faces risk if  he or she remains
with them in Afghanistan, or it may simply be that they
believe that their child will have a better life in this country.
Either way, they are unlikely to be happy to cooperate with an
agent of  the Secretary of  State for the return of  their child to
Afghanistan, which would mean the waste of  their investment
in his or her journey here.
The principles emerging from KA and EU were summarised
in the Upper Tribunal determination of SHL (Tracing
obligation/Trafficking) Afghanistan.96 Unfortunately this reported
case proceeded without the appellant or any representative.
The appellant, an orphan, feared Taliban recruitment, and
claimed he had been trafficked for forced labour. He had asked
the Red Cross to trace his uncle, but with no success. The UT
found him to be credible, accepted he was a minor with no family
to return to, accepted his reasons for leaving and accepted that
he had been forced to work in the UK, but decided that since he
was over 18 he could relocate to Kabul. The failure to attempt to
trace was irrelevant since he had no family and this was an
accepted fact. Importantly, the Upper Tribunal held that EU
(Afghanistan)marked a retreat from the ‘corrective principle’ of
Rashid, stating that ‘the judgment in EU re-emphasises the need
for the claimant to establish a proper foundation for the grant of
one of  the available forms of  protection’. The tribunal quoted with
approval Sir Stanley Burnton LJ’s comments in EU para 6 that the
court should not require the SSHD to grant leave as a sanction
for her misconduct.
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In relation to family tracing, the key principles emerging from
these cases are:
• The onus is on the child to make out their asylum claim to the
required standard of  proof.
• An unaccompanied child can constitute a particular social
group for the purposes of  the Refugee Convention (LQ) and
may be subject to serious harm on return depending on their
individual circumstances (AA (unattended children)).
• There is no bright line at which the risk of  persecution ceases
at the 18th birthday. Apparent or assumed age is more
important. (KA)
• Where a family assisted a child to travel to the UK, any
assertion that family members are unable to meet them on
return must be supported by credible evidence of  efforts to
contact those family members. In principle an adverse
finding can be made from a failure by a child to try to trace
their family. (HK)
• The SSHD’s duty to trace is an active duty which goes
beyond informing the child of  the existence of  the Red Cross
tracing service (DS)
• The tracing duty may be relevant to the judicial consideration
of the asylum claim. Failing to make efforts to trace the
child’s family could deprive the child of  an avenue for
corroborating their case (DS/HK/KA)
• A breach of  the tracing duty does not without more betoken
an error of  law by the SSHD giving rise to a corrective
remedy or vitiate any ensuing determination of  the first tier
tribunal. (SHL para 28)
• Neither European nor domestic law prescribes any sanction,
remedy or consequence for such a failure. (SHL para 28)
• The child must show the causative link between the SSHD’s
failure to trace and his claim to protection (KA/EU)
Of the EU appellants, the decision on QA is particularly
dismaying.97 He was 14 when he arrived, his account of  fearing
persecution from Hezb-e-islami was believed, and he was
found to be at risk on return. This had been overturned by the
Upper Tribunal on the basis that the first tier judge should have
considered internal relocation, since by the time of  the appeal
the Appellant had turned 18. The UT had also found that his
‘refusal’ to use the Red Cross to trace his family (because of  a
stated fear that any enquiries would place his mother at risk)
amounted to a failure to co-operate with family tracing, and so
the SSHD’s failure to attempt to trace had no relevance to the
asylum claim.
2 Family tracing and the ‘corrective remedy’
principle since KA and EU
The Court of  Appeal judgments in KA and EU, and their
application by the Upper Tribunal in SHL, are problematic for a
number of  reasons. First, those cases consider the applicability
of  the ‘corrective remedy’ principle in relation to family tracing,
a distinct type of  obligation imposed by an EU Directive, for
which there is no penalty or sanction for failure to comply. And
the underlying facts (whether the child is in touch with his family,
etc) are hard to know, so that a higher court considering
whether to apply a corrective remedy has to rely on tribunal
findings which our research shows are likely to be marred by
unreliable negative credibility decisions. In contrast, in relation
to the other litigated issues (flawed age assessments
subsequently corrected, Home Office failure to grant DL to a
minor, unlawful reliance on illegal entry interviews), it is easier to
establish the effects of  past errors or illegalities committed by
the Secretary of  State. In those types of  cases therefore the
fact of  injustice suffered by an applicant, and the need for a
remedy, is clearer.
Secondly, precisely because the assessment of  the impact of
the failure to trace in relation to young Afghan asylum-seekers
depends on credibility findings, such assessment is
inescapably infected by the whole gamut of  factors identified in
our research and in the other reports we have cited – factors
entirely beyond the control of  most applicants. Thus Kay LJ’s
‘hypothetical spectrum’ is unexceptionable in its own terms. Of
course a child who has obstructed attempts to trace his family
must have failed to prove a risk on return, and cannot establish
[any] such disadvantage from an institutional failure to
endeavour to trace his family. It may seem that this also applies
to the HK view, repeated in EU by Sir Stanley Burnton LJ, that
someone whose family paid for their journey must be able to
show that their family can no longer support them. This, taken in
its own terms, appears simply to spell out the burden of  proof
in such cases.
However, both those Court of  Appeal judgments
comprehensively fail to take account of research evidence
showing that the very process which determines where a child
will fall on the ‘hypothetical spectrum’, ie the child’s asylum
determination process, is fraught with errors, not all from the
Secretary of State. For all the reasons set out in our research
findings, it will often be unsafe and unjust to place young people
on Kay LJ’s spectrum by reference to the findings of fact in their
tribunal determinations. But this is precisely what has happened
to the appellants in EU, and in subsequent cases.
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Far from recognising this as a problem, the Court of  Appeal
itself  appears to be affected by the same ‘culture of  disbelief’
and penchant for relying on ‘incredibility’ and ‘implausibility’ as
the Home Office and tribunal. What Burnton LJ says in EU para
10 about the motivations of  Afghan families, or the likelihood of
cooperation about the proposed return of  their children, is
simply an assertion or an opinion of  a judge, not based on
evidence presented in that court.98 That opinion has now
effectively attained the status of  a country guidance finding
applying to all Afghan families. It is also concerning that the
Upper Tribunal should use SHL, a case in which neither the
Appellant nor his representative appeared, to interpret those
Court of  Appeal cases for the Tribunal, and effectively close off
the corrective principle even for appellants found credible.99
Given these decisions, it is not surprising that subsequent
Court of  Appeal cases demonstrate the very circular reasoning
we identified in Tribunal determinations in the cases in our
study. In AA (Iran)100 it was argued that if  the Home Office had
carried out its tracing duty it could not have been found that he
still had contact with his family. Tracing may also have produced
material supporting his claim to face persecution because of
his father and uncle’s political activities. Kay LJ rejected this,
arguing that the claim had been categorically rejected in its
own terms, and once rejected, “it was a short step to the
inexorable inference that the appellant had not lost contact with
the family whose whereabouts remain known to him” (para 15).
The circularity is clear:
a an appeal is dismissed on credibility grounds;
b it is inferred that the appellant has not given true information
about his family;
c which leads to a finding about his family;
d tracing may have produced evidence to challenge the
judge’s overall credibility assessment; 
e but because of  the finding regarding his family it is decided
that family tracing would have been unsuccessful, so no loss
has arisen from the failure to trace. 
AA v SSHD101 was an attempt to challenge this circular
reasoning. It was argued that tracing could have helped verify
the appellant’s asylum claim and led to different findings of
fact. The Court of  Appeal rejected submissions that in 2013
the SSHD was still systematically and deliberately failing to
endeavour to trace, but did find that not beginning the tracing
process until just before a decision to refuse asylum was a
breach. The breach was held to be inconsequential, since the
appellant was unable to provide enough information to enable
the SSHD to trace his family, so compliance would have made
no difference. In response to that, expert evidence was
submitted showing that family tracing was possible in
Afghanistan. The court considered whether the tracing duty
required steps such as asking embassy staff  to contact village
elders in the appellant’s home area. The court decided that
tracing was a sensitive matter touching on the relationship of
the UK and Afghan Governments and resource allocation
considerations, and so the SSHD ‘must necessarily enjoy a
wider margin of  appreciation’.
The court in AA v SSHD also again made clear that the duty to
obtain information in order to determine a child’s best interests
did not require the SSHD herself  to investigate the child’s
asylum claim – the burden of  proof remains with the
applicant.102 In Part 4 we will consider whether, when
considering children’s claims, an adversarial system that places
the sole burden on the child is truly compatible with a system
that is also supposed to consider their best interests.
Thus it appears that this line of  cases has shifted focus from a
proper consideration of  the child’s asylum claim, or of  his best
interests. Courts now routinely find that because a family
member paid for a child’s journey X years previously, it must be
assumed that they will be able to receive the child back into
their care: and conclude that, because a child cannot prove
that they are not in touch with their families, they must be in
touch, and therefore can be returned and their families will meet
them and take care of  them. None of  that is evidence, only
supposition, but to defeat those arguments needs good
preparation.
3 Should the courts act as a sanction against
the Secretary of State?
Recent judgments considering ‘legacy’ cases103 show a lack of
appetite in the higher courts for an expansion of  the Rashid
‘corrective principle’, certainly where the issue is ‘only’ the
random exclusion of  a claimant from a backlog-clearing
programme. However, in SHL, a child accepted to have been
trafficked to the UK, found to be under 18 on arrival, largely
credible, and with no relatives to return to, was yet denied
refugee status, because by the time his asylum claim was
conclusively determined he was over 18. As with some of  our
sample, had their cases been promptly and appropriately
handled upon arrival when they were younger children, they
may well have been granted refugee status. Clear errors of  law
and procedure had arguably been made during the processing
of these claims. In his recent report104 the Independent Chief
Inspector of  Borders and Immigration said:
Asylum claims made by unaccompanied children are some
of  the most sensitive cases dealt with by the Home Office.
They are a particularly vulnerable group and for that reason
their applications are subject to specific procedural
safeguards.
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A legal error in determining an individual claim of  this kind is
clearly different in quality from the kind of  administrative
randomness complained of  in legacy cases. Arguably it is
different even from the mischief  suffered by Rashid and R (S),
where bureaucratic workflow management led to their cases
among hundreds of  others not being considered under the
correct policy.
Where the detriment arises from an error in deciding or making
a judicial determination on an individual claim requiring
‘anxious scrutiny’, a failure to apply any corrective remedy in
our view arguably presents a problem for the rule of  law itself.
Given the evidence, from more than this research, of  poor-
quality determination of  young people’s asylum claims, Sir
Stanley Burnton’s and other judges’ unwillingness to use the
courts as a sanction against the Secretary of  State105 looks
particularly problematic. Poor handling of  a child’s asylum
claim leads in these types of  cases to a decision that is far
more difficult to appeal once the young person has turned 18
and no longer entitled to the additional protections appropriate
to minors. There is no other remedy available to these young
people,106 and given the worsening situation in Afghanistan it is
unsurprising that many remain in the UK unlawfully.
In the 2012 case of  AA (Afghanistan)107 Laws LJ held that
where it is alleged that the decision maker has failed to take into
account past unlawful conduct the court will only intervene on
traditional public law grounds. This leaves the weight to be
placed on the unlawful conduct to be decided by the same
decision maker who itself  committed the unlawful conduct.
Those ‘corrective remedy’ arguments have been made in a
number of  recent reported cases, with facts similar to those in
our sample, but few, whether on the family tracing point or in
relation to other historical illegalities, have been successful. The
cases below show that the courts’ approach to corrective
remedies has hardened, and even in successful cases the
relief  granted is uncertain.
In Jabarkhail,108 it was acknowledged by the court that had the
SSHD tried and failed to trace the 15 year old claimant’s family,
and that this could have corroborated his claim to be an
unaccompanied child, which should have led to a grant of
asylum. However:
‘…that loss of  a possibility does not amount to the
establishment of  a disadvantage or prejudice of  the sort
contemplated by KA and EU that would justify departing
from the decision that, on the basis of  the present facts and
circumstances there was no risk to the claimant if  he
returned to Afghanistan’. (para 31)
Mamour109 was accepted on appeal to be 16. However, in
breach of  Home Office policy, he was not granted any leave. A
fresh claim was rejected and the applicant (now well over 18)
was removed. A High Court judge accepted that the SSHD
failure to grant leave had been unlawful, but did not order the
appellant’s return to the UK, and made it clear that he did not
require the SSHD to grant leave, only to reconsider the
representations according to policy.
Social Services first assessed AA110 as aged 19 but later
accepted that he had been 15 on arrival. His claim was
processed with no appropriate safeguards, refused, and he
was not represented at his appeal. The Home Office delayed
reconsidering his claim until after his 18th birthday and then
refused to grant any leave because he was over 18. The High
Court ordered the SSHD to grant 3 years’ DL following AA
[2007].111 In the Court of  Appeal, Laws LJ held that the
erroneous age assessment was not a circumstance that led to
such conspicuous unfairness as to require a corrective remedy.
He did suggest that the SSHD should consider if  a decision
before his 18th birthday might have produced a favourable
outcome, but did not order any specific decision.
In TN & MA v SSHD,112 it was argued that granting DL for less
than a year with no right of  appeal against first refusal deprived
an applicant of  an effective remedy under European law. This
was rejected, as judicial review was held to be a sufficient
remedy. For one appellant it was further argued that delaying
the appeal until this young person had turned 18
disadvantaged him in terms of  the assessment of  credibility.
This was dismissed as the rejection of  his case had been well
reasoned and unequivocal. Yet again an appellant was placed
at the ‘wrong end’ of  Kay LJ’s ‘hypothetical spectrum’.
Hashemi v UT113 concerned a child without parents who
arguably had a claim for refugee status as an orphan. He had
not appealed his first refusal, and was over 18 when his appeal
against his second refusal was heard. The court held that he
had suffered no disadvantage by SSHD’s failure to trace, as he
could give little information about his family. Crucially the judge
noted that ‘there is a presumption the claimant was properly
advised and took an informed and advised decision in respect
of  any appeal. There is no evidence at all that the solicitors
here made any mistake of  professional judgment or otherwise’
(para 57, writers’ emphasis). Our research shows that this
presumption that young people make informed decisions about
the conduct of  their claim is unsafe.
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4 Too much reliance on ‘corrective remedies’?
The importance of better case preparation
and appealing the first refusal
The reported cases examined above show that strategic
litigation aimed at finding corrective remedies for children has
not been effective in holding the Home Office to account for
past errors and illegalities. Nor has it led to better decision-
making.
The above cases show how hard it is, and what litigation
lengths must be gone to, for former child asylum-seekers to
gain leave even where past illegalities are established. Even the
cases that were partially successful, such as Kuchiey,114 do not
in practice create effective precedents for other young people.
Every applicant wishing to advance these arguments has to re-
litigate the issue for themselves. With cuts to legal aid and
changes to judicial review fees and funding, it will be difficult for
those who have suffered a historical error of  law or procedure
to pursue litigation.
Halliday115 has argued that judicial review as a method of
ensuring executive accountability may have limited impact if  the
structural conditions in which the administration of  law in
government takes place is not conducive to the development of
legal conscientiousness. Our research, along with the other
quoted studies, shows that, in relation to young Afghan asylum-
seekers, ‘legal conscientiousness’ is often downgraded, or even
absent, from Home Office and even tribunal decision-making.
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In particular, the Home Office’s defensive response to the
family tracing challenges in the short time between DS
(Afghanistan)116 (decided in 2011) to AA (Afghanistan)117
(decided in 2013) has turned family tracing from a positive
obligation to be used to further a young person’s best
interests to yet another issue relied on by decision-makers
and tribunal judges to assail young people’s credibility. A
child’s good reasons for not wanting to trace a particular
family member, or declining an offer to trace (in circumstances
where tracing is admitted to be impossible) invariably leads to
negative findings of  fact for the child.
Practitioners at our round table discussion agreed that family
tracing issues are still important and must be competently dealt
with during case preparation. It is important that a tribunal sees
all the client’s attempts to cooperate and the Secretary of
State’s inaction. However, tribunal judges’ responses to this
issue vary widely.118
The round table participants considered that people had
unrealistic expectations in the wake of  the KA decision. It is
clear that only exceptionally will the courts order the Secretary
of  State to remedy past mistakes, noting that the political
context is more hostile than in the days of  Rashid. The
participants nevertheless felt that breaches of  procedural
fairness in a given case are still important and practitioners
should still consider making representations in relation to
‘illegal entry interviews’, as in AN & FN.119 However, our
conclusion from our research, supported by the majority of
the round table participants, is that the salient issues are to
ensure that young people’s initial claims are well prepared,
and that they appeal any first refusal while still a minor.








Currently we remain burdened with a system of  asylum
determination for unaccompanied young people which, though
claiming to act in their best interests, in fact keeps the majority
in a state of  uncertainty and anxiety120 by granting DL, a
decision amounting to a stay of  removal until they reach 18, at
which point international conventions on the rights of  the child
cease to apply. I appears that there is a conflict between the
need proactively to consider the child’s best interests and an
adversarial refugee determination procedure which places the
burden of  proof squarely on the child.121
Those with proactive and tenacious representatives and who
manage to successfully navigate the asylum system may gain
refugee status and the path to a sustainable future in the UK,
while the rest remain in the ante-room to removal. This does not
seem an appropriate way to address the challenges of  the
forced migration of  young people from countries such as
Afghanistan. We ask whether there should be any aspect of
arbitrariness in deciding the future prospects of  young people
when it is an agreed principle to put their best interests first.
Several alternative approaches have been proposed to the
handling of  children’s asylum claims, in which a child’s best
interests may constitute a ground of  protection in its own right.
Goodwin-Gill has argued that ‘we should move beyond the
blinkered notion that an answer to children in flight lies in
refugee status determination’ and that the Convention on the
Rights of  the Child should lead to a total realignment of
protection towards a complete welfare approach.122What is in
the best interests of  a child must be understood to include
decisions and actions which will affect the child after the age
of  eighteen, and this should be the key focus when making
decisions about their immigration status. It has been argued
that a child is foremost a child, before he or she is a refugee,
and protection needs should be assessed in the specific
framework of  the Convention on the Rights of  the Child.
The Coram Children’s Legal Centre held a round table
discussion in December 2011 to discuss the development of a
new model of assessment and status determination, better
equipped to meet the needs and best interests of children and
young people.123 This suggested that a new international child
protection division of the family court, freed from the political
imperatives associated with immigration control and adopting a
more inquisitorial, co-operative approach, whose primary
function is to ensure that the best interests of children is met,
may be a progressive alternative to the current refugee status
determination procedure. In our view the principal, immediate,
benefit would be the shift of burden of proof from the child
applicant to a shared burden.124 However, our round table
participants felt that for those children and young people who
qualify for international protection, a formal recognition of refugee
status, and the concomitant leave to remain, is important.
The Upper Tribunal recently stated in JS (Former unaccompanied
child – durable solution) Afghanistan125 that ‘This Tribunal is not
concerned with future planning for the welfare of children.
Our concern is whether the appellant is entitled to humanitarian
protection or whether returning him will be in breach of  Article 8’
(para 35 – writers’ emphasis).Given this admission, arguably a
different tribunal is needed which will take a more holistic
approach to the needs of unaccompanied children.
Our research shows clearly that such an approach is a long way
from what happens to young asylum-seekers under UK
procedures. The Immigration Bill, passing through parliament at
the time of writing, shows no intention of adopting a more
progressive approach to the consideration of unaccompanied
minors’ asylum claims.126 Instead the UK, together with Norway,
Sweden and the Netherlands, is currently involved in the European
Return Platform for Unaccompanied Minors (ERPUM) which is
seeking new ways to return minors to Afghanistan before they turn
18. In order to achieve this it is intended to develop ways of
contacting the parents of asylum-seeking minors to facilitate
return, or alternatively establishing ‘dedicated care centres’ in
Afghanistan.127 It is unclear to what extent the child’s best interests
will be considered when making any such decision.
Conclusion
Our research examined the whole of the asylum process
experienced by young people in Kent. Our evidence has
supported concerns raised in a number of reports about different
aspects of the asylum process for young people in the UK. Our
intention at the outset was to assist as many clients as possible to
make further claims, using ‘corrective remedy’ submissions where
appropriate. During the course of the research, as the law has
developed post-KA, the courts have shown themselves
increasingly unwilling to intervene in such cases, with a dismaying
reliance on credibility issues even in the higher courts. We doubt
whether this litigation has had a positive impact on the ‘legal
conscientiousness’ of the Home Office. In particular, the tracing
duty, imposed for the purposes of safeguarding the best interests
of minors, has become yet another aspect of the adversarial
asylum process that can be used to young people’s disadvantage.
Our research has reinforced the conclusions of many other cited
reports, of the crucial importance of good early case preparation
and appealing the first refusal. Analysing the ‘asylum journey’
experienced by our ‘failed asylum-seeker’ clients has been acutely
frustrating for us as practitioners, as it is clear that in some cases
the outcome would have been different had the cases been
handled in a timely and legally correct way from the outset. As the
conflict in Afghanistan continues, more young people continue to
arrive in Kent and pass through the current flawed asylum
process. A few will be fortunate and be recognised as refugees.
The majority will make the transition into adulthood with continuing
anxiety over their immigration status. With no real prospect of
improving the asylum process, it is arguably time to give serious
consideration to alternative models for the consideration of
children’s claims.
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